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Abstract: Offset schemes help avoid or revert habitat loss through protection of existing habitat (avoided
deforestation), through the restoration of degraded areas (natural regrowth), or both. The spatial scale of
an offset scheme may influence which of these 2 outcomes is favored and is an important aspect of the
scheme’s design. However, how spatial scale influences the trade-offs between the preservation of existing
habitat and restoration of degraded areas is poorly understood. We used the largest forest offset scheme in the
world, which is part of the Brazilian Forest Code, to explore how implementation at different spatial scales
may affect the outcome in terms of the area of avoided deforestation and area of regrowth. We employed a
numerical simulation of trade between buyers (i.e., those who need to offset past deforestation) and sellers
(i.e., landowners with exceeding native vegetation) in the Brazilian Amazon to estimate potential avoided
deforestation and regrowth at different spatial scales of implementation. Allowing offsets over large spatial
scales led to an area of avoided deforestation 12 times greater than regrowth, whereas restricting offsets to
small spatial scales led to an area of regrowth twice as large as avoided deforestation. The greatest total
area (avoided deforestation and regrowth combined) was conserved when the spatial scale of the scheme
was small, especially in locations that were highly deforested. To maximize conservation gains from avoided
deforestation and regrowth, the design of the Brazilian forest-offset scheme should focus on restricting the
spatial scale in which offsets occur. Such a strategy could help ensure conservation benefits are localized and
promote the recovery of degraded areas in the most threatened forest landscapes.
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Resumen: Los esquemas de compensacio´n ayudan a evitar o revertir la pe´rdida de ha´bitat mediante
la proteccio´n del ha´bitat existente (deforestacio´n evitada), mediante la restauracio´n de a´reas degradadas
(recrecimiento natural) o ambos. La escala espacial de una mitigacio´n puede influir en cua´l de ellos es
seleccionado y es un aspecto importante del disen˜o de esquema. Sin embargo, no se entiende bien co´mo influye
la escala espacial en las compensaciones entre la preservacio´n del ha´bitat existente y la restauracio´n de a´reas
degradadas. Utilizamos el esquema de compensacio´n forestal ma´s grande del mundo, que forma parte del
Co´digo Forestal Brasilen˜o, para explorar co´mo la implementacio´n a diferentes escalas espaciales puede afectar
el resultado en te´rminos de la superficie de deforestacio´n evitada y el a´rea de recrecimiento. Empleamos una
simulacio´n nume´rica del comercio entre compradores (i. e., aquellos que necesitan compensar la deforestacio´n
pasada) y vendedores (i. e., propietarios con exceso de vegetacio´n nativa) en la Amazonı´a brasilen˜a para
estimar deforestacio´n evitada y el recrecimiento a diferentes escalas espaciales de implementacio´n. Permitir
compensaciones en grandes escalas espaciales dio lugar a una superficie de deforestacio´n evitada 12 veces
mayor que de recrecimiento, mientras que restringir compensaciones a pequen˜as escalas espaciales dio lugar
a una superficie de recrecimiento dos veces mayor que la deforestacio´n evitada. La mayor superficie total
(deforestacio´n evitada y recrecimiento combinados) se conservo´ cuando la escala espacial del esquema era
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pequen˜a, especialmente en localidades muy deforestadas. Para maximizar los beneficios de conservacio´n
derivados de la deforestacio´n evitada y el recrecimiento, el disen˜o del esquema brasilen˜o de compensaciones
debe centrarse en restringir la escala espacial en la que se producen las compensaciones. Esta estrategia
ayudar´ıa a garantizar que los beneficios de la conservacio´n sean localizados y promuevan la recuperacio´n
de zonas degradadas en los paisajes forestales ma´s amenazados.
Palabras Clave: Amazon´ıa, compensaciones, conservacio´n, deforestacio´n evitada, escala espacial, restauracio´n,
tierras privadas
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Introduction
A variety of mechanisms have been developed to man-
age human-caused habitat change and promote outcomes
that aid conservation (Betts et al. 2017). Some of these
systems incentivize landowners to follow good environ-
mental practices (e.g., subsidy payments and payments
for ecosystem services) (Pirard 2012), whereas others leg-
islate to ensure past or future environmental disturbances
are compensated for (e.g., tradable permits or habitat and
biodiversity offset schemes) (Santos et al. 2014). The lat-
ter group operates as markets, in which environmental
goods are traded between landowners who supply the
market goods (i.e., sellers) and those who need to com-
pensate for environmental damage (i.e., buyers) (Ring
et al. 2010).
Offset schemes have gained popularity around the
globe due to the straightforward logic of trading environ-
mental losses for equivalent conservation gains, although
there has been concern whether such equivalency can,
in fact, be achieved (Bull et al. 2013, 2015). To com-
pensate for environmental loss, offset schemes typically
use averted loss, restoration, or both as offset strategies
(Maron et al. 2012). Averted loss targets the protection
of existing biodiversity and natural habitat potentially at
risk of being lost, whereas restoration favors the recovery
of degraded habitats and promotes secondary vegetation
(Curran et al. 2014; Maron et al. 2016).
The trade-offs between the advantages and disadvan-
tages of conservation schemes that favor either averted
loss or restoration have been extensively debated (e.g.,
Maron et al. 2012; Gardner et al. 2013; Curran et al. 2014;
Que´tier et al. 2015). Although the length of time restora-
tion requires increases the risk of failure (Drechsler &
Hartig 2011; Maron et al. 2012), this strategy may be
attractive if restoration occurs on site or near affected
areas (Wissel & Wa¨tzold 2010). For example, where neg-
ative impacts are caused by land-cover change to pasture
or agriculture, such as in many tropical forest regions,
restoration via natural regrowth has been promoted to
recover degraded land and enhance secondary forest
cover (Chazdon et al. 2016; Strassburg et al. 2016). In
contrast, averted loss can protect old-growth vegetation,
but to result in effective conservation gains, the area
protected needs to be ecologically equivalent (i.e., the
same vegetation type) as the damaged site (Bull et al.
2013). The protection also needs to occur in sites where
threats or development pressure are imminent so as to
generate benefits that would not occur in the absence
of the scheme—a concept called “additionality” (Maron
et al. 2010).
A key element that determines the effectiveness of
averted loss and restoration is the spatial location of
the offset (Gonc¸alves et al. 2015). Studies that use
conservation-planning approaches to identify the spa-
tial scale (e.g., local or regional) where potential offsets
should be located typically consider specific biological
targets or habitat characteristics (e.g., species distribu-
tions or the presence of certain taxa) to determine where
offsets should occur (e.g., Kiesecker et al. 2009; Gordon
et al. 2011; Kujala et al. 2015). These studies indicate both
local (e.g., site and microwatershed) and regional (e.g.,
biome and river basin) spatial scales have the potential
to achieve averted loss and restoration goals if offsets
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are placed in strategically defined areas. Conservation-
planning approaches have been particularly useful in
offset schemes that explicitly include biodiversity met-
rics in their offset strategies (Gordon et al. 2011). How-
ever, some offset schemes have simpler offset conditions
(e.g., a hectare of loss for a hectare of gain) that do
not include specific biodiversity metrics (McKenney &
Kiesecker 2010). In these cases, conservation-planning
approaches cannot be used so readily to determine the
optimal location of offsets. For these schemes, adminis-
trative boundaries, such as the limits to municipalities,
states, or counties, may be an appropriate way to influ-
ence the spatial scale and location of offsets to facilitate
environmental governance and potentiallymaximize con-
servation benefits (Nepstad et al. 2013; Boyd et al. 2018).
Administrative boundaries have been used to define
the spatial scales of offset schemes in the United States
(e.g., for conservation banking and transferable develop-
ment rights, McKenney & Kiesecker 2010) and in Brazil
(Brazilian Forest offsets, Soares-Filho et al. 2014). They
represent well-known jurisdictions in which many policy
decisions already operate and therefore facilitate the im-
plementation of offset markets. Some studies suggest that
averted loss may not be achieved within offset schemes
that use small administrative boundaries to limit trade
because this restriction will lead to a reduced number of
sellers and little area available for compensation (Chomitz
2004; McConnell & Walls 2009). Conversely, in some
offset schemes, the use of larger administrative bound-
aries to expand trade may lead to limited additionality.
In these cases, areas not under development pressure
are likely to absorb the offsets that the scheme requires
because these areas will tend to have low opportunity
costs and outcompete areas under deforestation pressure
that are typically associated with high opportunity costs
(Santos et al. 2014). Hence, only areas that would likely
remain untouched even in the absence of the scheme
may ultimately be protected, and scheme additionality
will be very low (McConnell & Walls 2009; Freitas et al.
2017). However, explicit tests of how the spatial scale
of offsets may alter the trade-offs between averted loss
and restoration, and overall scheme additionality, have
not been performed.
We quantified the effect of scale on the trade-offs be-
tween averted loss and restoration as additional conserva-
tion outcomes of an offset scheme included in the Brazil-
ian Forest Code (FC) (officially known as the Brazilian
Native Vegetation Protection Law [Brasil 2012]). The FC
regulates the protection of native vegetation on private
land (Azevedo et al. 2017) and requires that a certain
percentage of the property be set aside and managed for
conservative purposes, referred to as legal reserves (LRs)
(Freitas et al. 2017). The percentages vary according to
the biome, ranging from 20% (in the Atlantic Forest) to
80% (in the Amazon). Landowners who have LRs below
these limits (i.e., is a buyer) due to past deforestation
must offset their LR deficit. Buyers can offset by acquir-
ing private land inside protected areas and PAs that are
pending regularization, leasing existing native vegetation
of landowners who have LRs that exceed the limits (i.e.,
sellers) and can be legally deforested (e.g., >80% in the
Amazon), or allowing natural forest regrowth in their LR
deficit (see details in Methods).
We focused on the Amazon, the world’s largest stand-
ing forest, which covers 400 million hectares (Assunc¸a˜o
et al. 2017) and holds nearly 26% of total carbon stored
in tropical forests (Baccini et al. 2012). Since 2014, de-
forestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon have risen and
endanger national commitments to reduce carbon emis-
sions from deforestation (Rochedo et al. 2018). We used
avoided deforestation to represent averted loss and nat-
ural regrowth as a restoration strategy because these
are the principal conservation outcomes of the offset
strategies within this example. We employed different
administrative boundaries as approximations of different
spatial scales (i.e., small to large) and compared the effect
of scale on conservation outcomes across a range of pol-
icy scenarios. The administrative boundaries represent
regions over which the scheme could be implemented
and are well-established jurisdictions. We hypothesized
that allowing offsets across large spatial scales yieldsmore
avoided deforestation than regrowth (but not necessarily
more additionality), given the number of sellers available
to offset, whereas the opposite occurs at small spatial
scales. We expected intermediary spatial scales to yield
similar gains from avoided deforestation and regrowth.
We estimated regrowth and avoided deforestation using
numerical simulation of offset trade between >370000
buyers and sellers and considered our results in light of
the current implementation guidelines for the FC and
other offsetting policies.
Methods
Details of Case Study
In Brazil, private lands within established PAs need to
be expropriated by the statutory environmental agency
because they are still under private ownership. The FC
states that such process can be used as an offset option
by buyers. In this case, buyers must purchase an entire
property (including cleared portions) inside a PA that is
at least equivalent to their LR deficit and donate to the
environmental agency (option 1). This option allows for
a perpetual solution for buyers, which appears to be their
preferred option (Giannichi et al. 2018).
The lease of existing native vegetation is called Envi-
ronmental Reserve Quota (CRA) (Cota de Reserva Ambi-
ental). The CRA is a hectare-by-hectare market, wherein
a buyer can lease the extra LRs of several sellers or one
seller can supply several buyers (option 2). Instead of
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a single perpetual transaction as the acquisition of land
in PAs, CRA consists of contracts in which the price of
the hectare and the duration of the contract are decided
between buyers and sellers. Some buyers may prefer to
offset their LR deficit by allowing the natural regrowth of
secondary forest (option 3) (Soares-Filho et al. 2016).
We used a land-tenure database (Freitas et al. 2017) to
acquire landowners’ property boundaries and land-cover
data sets (TerraClass, De Almeida et al. [2016], and
Global Forest Change, Hansen et al. [2013]) to calculate
the extent of the LR at property level. Based on the
LR extent, we classified them into buyers or sellers.
According to the FC, a landowner is a potential buyer
if LR deforestation occurred prior to 2008. If the LR
currently exceeds 80%, the property was classified as
a seller. On private lands, LR that exceeds 80% can be
legally deforested, up to that same limit. Although native
vegetation below this amount cannot be deforested (so
its protection in an offset scheme is not additional), in
some cases landowners who have LR below 80% are
also eligible to supply the market. These cases include
smallholders (i.e., family-managed properties <400 ha)
and settlements (i.e., former megaproperties that were
underused and allotted and distributed to families)
that can offer any amount of LR within their property.
Private properties inside PAs were also classified as
sellers, and their native vegetation was considered
nonadditional because its standing native vegetation
is already protected and cannot be legally deforested.
Supporting Information contains details on the FC, the
data sets used, and the classification of buyers and sellers.
Offset Spatial Scales and Policy Scenarios
We considered 5 different nested administrative
boundaries as offset spatial scales (Table 1 & Fig. 1),
from the large (biome) to small (municipality). The FC
states that offsets must occur within the same biome. If
between states, offsets must occur in areas identified as
priorities for conservation (Supporting Information). The
FC does not account for ecological equivalence between
buyers and sellers to offset forest loss (e.g., biomass
or biodiversity equivalence). Besides the boundaries
mentioned in the law (biome and state), we used
other 3 nationally established administrative boundaries
(Table 1) that could facilitate implementation. The
FC offset scheme has not been fully regulated; thus,
offset scales can still be amended once each state
legislates their own offsetting rules. Apart from biome,
all administrative boundaries include several individual
polygons that vary in size (Table 1).
For each spatial scale, we considered the following
3 policy scenarios (Supporting Information). Offsets oc-
curred in all PAs, CRA, and regrowth (scenario 1). Offsets
were allowed on private land inside all PAs. The text in
the FC is not specific about whether the PA must be
a federal, state, or municipal area. Thus, this scenario
included offsets in all PAs first, followed by CRA offset
trade, and then the remaining buyers were assigned to
offset through regrowth.
Offsets occurred in federal PAs, CRA, and regrowth
(scenario 2). TheMinistry of the Environment established
a regulatory framework (Brasil 2016) that considers only
federal PAs for compensation. As states still need to leg-
islate their offset rules, we included this framework as a
scenario and excluded offsets in state and municipal PAs
first, followed by CRA offset trade, and then remaining
buyers were assigned to offset through regrowth.
Offsets occurred with CRA and regrowth (scenario 3).
This scenario ruled out offsets on private land inside any
PA and included only CRA trade first, and then remaining
buyers were assigned to offset through regrowth.
Scenario 1 included all offset options stated by law—
the most permissive scenario. Scenarios 2 and 3 gradually
imposed policy restrictions associated with the offsetting
options. The different policy scenarios were established
to examine whether the results of our simulations would
be driven by the spatial scales or by the different rules of
the policy scenarios. For example, offset in PAs is unique
to the FC, and removing this option allowed a more gen-
eral examination of the effect of scale on offset schemes
outcomes.
We assumed compliance is a buyer-led strategy because
noncompliance incurs severe penalties, such as fines,
land embargoes, or denial of access to loans. Therefore,
buyers actively sought sellers in our analysis. Offset in
PAs appears to be preferred by buyers because, besides
being in perpetuity (Giannichi et al. 2018), they tend to
be low cost (Freitas et al. 2017). Thus, in policy scenarios
1 and 2, we first attempted to exhaust demand inside the
respective PAs.
To simulate offset (PAs and CRA), we developed an
algorithm (Supporting Information) in which each buyer
sought the best-matching seller. The algorithm is deter-
ministic, meaning the deals between buyers and sellers
are established based on the smallest difference between
buyer’s deficit and seller’s surplus. In the case of offset-
ting in PAs, buyers must acquire an area that is at least
equivalent to their deficit; thus, only one transaction was
allowed. We assumed that, given their low cost, buyers
would be willing to purchase an area that was up to 20%
larger than their LR deficit. If such conditions were met, a
buyerwas considered compliant. If not, a buyer remained
noncompliant and available for CRA trade.
The CRA is a hectare-by-hectare offset market; thus,
buyers looked for sellers that had the most similar area
of native vegetation surplus to their deficit. Buyers were
considered compliant if they managed to offset all their
deficit in 3 transactions (3 transactions were also estab-
lished for sellers). We assumed a limited number of trans-
actions because the general behavior of landowners is
to minimize transaction costs associated with each trade
(Reid et al. 2015). If a buyer remained noncompliant after
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Table 1. Number of polygons that comprises each spatial scale (administrative boundary) and respective deciles of polygon sizes in the Brazilian
Amazon biome.
Polygons 1st decile (Mha) 5th decile (Mha) 9th decile (Mha)
Biome∗ 1 – – –
State 9 9.82 22.43 131.00
Mesoregion 26 1.65 9.26 38.67
Microregion 81 0.55 3.11 12.14
Municipality 499 0.04 0.30 2.12
∗
A single unit of 422 million ha; thus, there are no deciles.
Figure 1. Across the Amazon biome, the (a) distribution and size of legal reserve (LR) deficits of buyers (i.e.,
native vegetation below the limits established by law, for the Amazon biome <80%) and surpluses of sellers at the
property level (reds, deficits; blues, surpluses) and (b) categories of landowners: buyers (i.e., landowners who have
LR deficits), sellers (i.e., landowners with LR surpluses), settlements, small sellers, and sellers inside protected areas
(white, unassessed areas, such as areas with no land titles gray, protected areas).
CRA trade, they were automatically allocated to offset
through natural regrowth by default.
The assumptions above are simplifications of a com-
plex and embryonic offset policy. There is still no data
on offsets in PAs and CRA as they are still in early or
pending regulatory stages. We submitted our simulations
to a sensitivity analysis (Supporting Information) inwhich
we progressively increased the 20% limit of private land
inside PAs and increased the number of transactions al-
lowed in CRA to assess whether our results are robust.
The best-match algorithmwas iterated for each of the 3
policy scenarios at each of the 5 spatial scales. After each
of the 15 simulations, we computed the sum of total
offset (in Mha) for each of the 3 compliance options:
offset in PAs, CRA, and regrowth. Offset in PAs was di-
vided into 2 conservation outcomes: the area of potential
regrowth and the area representing nonadditional offset.
Private land in PAs, after acquired by buyers, must be
donated to the statutory environmental agency, making
their cleared portions likely to be allocated to regrowth.
The area covered by natural vegetation was therefore
considered nonadditional because it is already protected.
Total offset with CRA was also divided into 2 conserva-
tion outcomes: avoided deforestation and nonadditional
offset. Avoided deforestation corresponded to offsets oc-
curring in unprotected native vegetation (e.g., vegetation
that can be deforested). Last, offsets through regrowth
outside PAs were computed as a single conservation
outcome.
To calculate total additionality for each simulation, we
summed avoided deforestation and regrowth (inside and
outside PAs), assuming these are both conservation ben-
efits that would not occur in the absence of the offset
scheme. Nonadditional outcomes represented offsets in
already protected vegetation that are mostly in the land of
smallholders and settlements. Thus, the key conservation
outcomes of this analysis were avoided deforestation, re-
growth, and total additionality. Finally, for each policy
scenario and spatial scale, we calculated the percentages
of each conservation outcome based on the total deficit
to assess the proportion of total forest deficit that was
effectively converted to a conservation gain.
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Results
The total native vegetation deficit across the Brazilian
Amazon was 4.94 Mha, whereas the total supply of native
vegetation that could be used for compensation was 10
times greater (50 Mha) (Fig. 1). Of this, 8.8 Mha could be
legally deforested according to current legislation. Of the
41Mha that could not be legally deforested, 17.8Mhawas
in settlements and 13 Mha in already protected vegeta-
tion, such as private land inside PAs. Small landholdings
and nonadditional sellers could offer 8.5 and 1.5 Mha,
respectively. There were substantial differences in the
spatial distribution of the deficit. Mato Grosso, Para´, and
Rondoˆnia contributed 80% of the total deficit; northern
Mato Grosso and southeastern Para´ contained around half
of the deficit (2.3Mha). These regions are inevitably likely
to absorb much of the demand for surplus.
Effect of Spatial Scale
Simulations showed 3 main results. First, as scales be-
came smaller, the area of offsets via avoided deforestation
decreased and the area of offsets via regrowth increased
(Table 2 & Fig. 2). Across all scenarios, offsets via avoided
deforestation remained higher than regrowth at all scales,
except at themunicipality level, wheremore offsets were
allocated to regrowth. This patternwas observed because
although some municipalities hold large amounts of for-
est deficit and little surplus, others have vast amounts of
surplus and very little deficit (Fig. 1). At the municipality
level, this imbalance became more evident because mu-
nicipalities with large amounts of deficit had little surplus
to offset. Consequently, as scale decreased, we observed
an increased contribution of regrowth to total additional-
ity and a decreased contribution of avoided deforestation
(Fig. 2).
Second, the total area directed to conservation was
larger in an offset scheme implemented at smaller scales
than in a scheme allowing offsets over large scales. Us-
ing scenario 1 as an example (Fig. 2), 2.07 Mha (41.9%)
of the total deficit resulted in avoided deforestation and
regrowth at the municipality level, whereas at the biome
level, 1.38 Mha (27.8%) of the total deficit resulted in
avoided deforestation and regrowth (Table 2).
Third, spatial scales also altered the area of offsets in-
side PAs. As the scale of implementation was reduced,
offsets inside PAs declined substantially (Table 2). The
total supply of private land inside PAs would likely be
enough to absorb the entire total deficit when using
larger scales (e.g., biome) and result in very little ad-
ditionality. However, our simulations showed that re-
ducing the spatial scale also reduced offsets inside PAs
because high supply from PAs is less available at smaller
scales.
Our sensitivity analysis showed that increasing the
best-match limit of offset in PAs from 20% to 150% re-
sulted in an increase of only 4% of the total offset, at
all scales (Supporting Information). This result indicated
that even if our best-match assumptions were more flex-
ible, our findings would likely remain the same, and that
smaller scales would still result in more additionality than
larger scales.
In all scenarios, across all spatial scales, most of the off-
set was nonadditional. In scenarios 1 and 2, offsets in PAs
generated little regrowth compared to the total offset.
For CRA offsets, avoided deforestation was lower than
the nonadditional offsets. Overall, the total additionality
was <50% in all scenarios; scenario 3 resulted in the
greatest total additionality across all scales (Table 2).
Discussion
The offset simulation exercise showed that for the FC off-
set scheme, larger spatial scales achieved more avoided
deforestation compared with smaller spatial scales that
were associated with more regrowth. However, avoided
deforestation was not substantially reduced at smaller
spatial scales, meaning the greatest total benefit to con-
servation in terms of area was achieved at the smallest
scale of offset implementation. These results were con-
sistent across all 3 policy scenarios, demonstrating that
the trade-offs linked to scale apply regardless of whether
buyers were allowed to offset for their deficit by acquir-
ing private land within PAs.
Our findings have a range of scheme-specific policy
implications. First, the FC currently states that CRAoffsets
must happen in the same biome and, preferably, in the
same state (Soares-Filho et al. 2014). However, CRA off-
sets are still pending official regulation, and each state is
entitled to restrict the offset scale within their boundaries
(Freitas et al. 2017). Our findings indicate that restricting
offsets to the municipality level could result in greater
additionality. Second, offsets inside PAs placed within
the largest scale (biome) absorbed almost one-third of
the total forest deficit, resulting in very little additionality
(Table 2). However, ourmodel showed that at a small spa-
tial scale, offsets in PAswere substantially reduced as they
become less available at local levels, particularly in areas
where buyers are highly concentrated (Fig. 1). Offsets
in PAs have been seen as problematic given their high
supply and low additionality (Soares-Filho et al. 2016)
because these areas are already protected by law (Fre-
itas et al. 2017). At the same time, this offset option is
unlikely to be ruled out by policy makers. Because PAs
become scarcer at the smallest scale, offsets in PAs could
also occur at this scale to promote greater additionality
and result in more avoided deforestation and regrowth
offsets.
Our results also suggest that the spatial scales of
implementation may influence associated ecological
outcomes of the scheme. For example, a large-scale
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Figure 2. Expected spatial distribution and extent of (a) avoided deforestation, (b) regrowth, and (c) total
additionality at nested spatial scales (rows: biome, state, mesoregion, microregion, and municipality [Table 1],
respectively, from left to right) for policy scenario 1 (purchase land inside PAs). Maps show conservation outcomes
as a proportion of the total area of the spatial scale units (the darker the shade, the greater the conservation
outcome; light gray, areas with no buyers; numbers under each map, sum of the given conservation outcome
across all spatial scale units).
implementation could favor the protection of old-growth
forests in the Amazon through averted loss. Consider-
ing that deforestation may likely occur in the future
(Soares-Filho et al. 2006), the protection of old-growth
forests is highly important for conservation. For exam-
ple, mature Amazon forests act as a carbon sink (Brienen
et al. 2015) and play an important role in mitigating
carbon emissions of Amazonian nations (Phillips et al.
2017). The protection of these forests also contributes
to the conservation of biodiversity-rich areas, which are
key to effectively deliver ecosystem services and func-
tions, such as seed dispersal and carbon storage (Sobral
et al. 2017). However, at large scales, offsets may take
place far from where deforestation occurred, undermin-
ing ecological equivalence (Wissel & Wa¨tzold 2010). In
contrast, small-scale implementation could favor restora-
tion through secondary forest regrowth, which may
partly counterbalance biodiversity loss from deforesta-
tion (Barlow et al. 2007), increase carbon sequestra-
tion and above-ground biomass in degraded sites, and
contribute to the connectivity of fragmented landscapes
(Chazdon et al. 2016). Because the offsetting rules con-
sider only forest area, we assumed equal weights for both
averted loss and restoration in our additionality metrics.
However, from an ecological perspective, averted loss
and restoration will likely result in distinct conservation
benefits because 1 ha of preserved old-growth forest
is ecologically different from 1 ha of secondary forest
(Poorter et al. 2016; Watson et al. 2018). To better un-
derstand these ecological implications, future research
could include potential ecological benefits (e.g., biomass
or species similarity between deficit and offsetting ar-
eas) at different implementation scales. Given the de-
cay of community composition with distance (Socolar
et al. 2016), it is likely that greater ecological equiva-
lence would be achieved through a more local offset
scheme.
Our analyses have some limitations. For example, price
usually influences trade activity between buyers and sell-
ers. Particularly for sellers, price is related to forgone
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opportunity costs but that is not the case for buyers,
who expect price to be much lower than sellers’ for-
gone opportunity costs (Giannichi et al. 2018). Perhaps
at smaller scales, where opportunity costs are high, there
would be even less averted loss and more restoration
because sellers would expect high returns of their sur-
plus, making restoration a less costly offset option for
buyers. However, this may not lead to any substantial
impact on the overall additionality. We did not include
price in this analysis because data specific to properties
are inexistent. Some previous researchers accounted for
price by using opportunity costs as a proxy (Bernasconi
et al. 2016; Soares-Filho et al. 2016) at the scale of mu-
nicipalities, but we believe this reflects only sellers’ price
preferences. More empirical data on price expectations
would be useful in future analyses. Our algorithm was
based on the assumption that all sellers were available
for trade and that each buyer can find the optimal seller,
which may not be true. However, we believe it would be
arbitrary and unrealistic to establish criteria that would
exclude nonparticipant sellers because there are no data
that support this decision.
Our findings showed that limiting offsets to a
small-scale approach yielded greater additionality in a
countrywide offset scheme. Although these findings
were particular to the FC offset scheme, we believe that
other offset schemeswith similar options of restoration or
buying credits elsewhere could benefit from the results
of this study. When buyers are randomly or uniformly
distributed in space, total additionality is likely to be less
dependent upon the scale of the offset scheme. However,
in most cases buyers’ distribution was aggregated in ar-
eas that are highly suitable for intensive agriculture (e.g.,
Fig. 1). Such areas are less likely to include cheap alter-
natives to restoration, but any offsetting area is likely to
contribute to additionality (due to the overall suitability of
the area for agriculture and the proximity of the area to in-
frastructure). As the allowed scale for offsetting increases,
so does the market size because it moves into areas less
suitable for agriculture (Santos et al. 2014). This phe-
nomenon increases the chances of landowners finding
cheap alternatives to restoration through credit buying.
However, the areas acquired are far from infrastructure
or are less suitable for agriculture, and as such they are
at leaser risk of being developed (i.e., contribute less to
additionality). Keeping restoration near the affected site
could be particularly helpful for offset schemes in regions
where development is predominant and restoration is
feasible. Allowing offset schemes to occur more locally
may be a way to incentivize the recovery of the lost habi-
tat and avoid further loss in the surrounding landscape
matrix. Given the vast amounts of degraded land and
the recent global efforts to restore degraded landscapes
(Verdone & Seidl 2017), localized strategies to promote
regrowth may be a way to achieve ambitious restoration
targets. The protection of natural vegetation remnants is
important, but alone is not sufficient to deliver long-term
conservation goals (Chazdon & Guariguata 2016). Other
large-scale conservation strategies could also benefit from
a think-local focus to improve schemes’ additionality and
maximize gains from averted loss and restoration.
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